Pipeline access rights: Refined oil first, then HydrogenGas or OceanWater in TransMountain in future

Sent to all Canadian Premiers, Provincial and Territorial and Federal Environment and Natural Resources Ministers and Dep Prime Minister, copied to First Nations chiefs, December 2, 2019.

The following proposal was first sent to the prior government of Alberta, and to federal Ministers, in Nov 2018 (a year of action has been lost):

1. Gov of Canada could legislate a minimum right of access for lighter oil shippers to existing oil pipelines:

- To immediately reserve a minimum capacity allocation for traditional lighter oil, based on its shipments during a reference period;
eg. all pipelines must reserve for non-heavy oil transport the same volume for Dec 2018 as was carried in Dec 2017.

- This solution, to prevent economic collapse of the pump-jack oil drilling industry, is based on a news report interview which attributed the contagion of price undercutting, from the heavy oils sector to the light oils sector, to be the result of new heavy oil producers with financial strength coming into production and purchasing pipeline capacity, denying traditional shippers of lighter oil adequate continued affordable access to the pipelines originally built to serve their long established lighter oils (pump-jack) industry.

- May require draconian federal legislation to immediately overrule contracts signed by oligopolies for access to limited pipelines capacity ....
-- perhaps some argument about halting unfair trading practice or monopolistic cartel,
-- perhaps argue that the pipelines were originally authorized for the lighter oil of that era, and not for the heavier oil of today,
-- or even enact it and risk courts might later require modification.

- With guaranteed minimum access to pipeline capacity in perpetuity, the winter drilling season can recommence as usual with confidence.

- Within the residual pipelines capacity that heavy oil producers would bid for, government could further dare to legislate rules such as:
-- the pipeline company must offer to each producer the right to ship in Dec 2018 at least 90% of what was shipped in Dec 2017, for not more than 110% of the price.
- to protect older operating companies, for whom pipelines were originally built, from loss of business due to new producers buying up the existing capacity rights of access to market
- it is the new producers of heavy oil who ought to bear the consequences of the risk of their building new operations based on wishful thinking that more pipeline capacity would have been installed in time.

- Rules similar to these were applied to allocate railcar service among the grain shipping companies, based on historical shipments, during the 1980's era.
-- (not a perfect regulation then, and I did at that time propose it be changed to a rule that the oldest grain stocks should always be the next shipped, to better allow for new entrants to the industry and to ensure no food grain stocks deteriorated from age.)
-- In our grains sector, we have squabbled over rights of access to monopolistic rail shipping capacity for over a century -- the legislation and rules continually evolve and are never perfect, but has at least regulation functioned to serve small shippers with better access than would have no regulations at all.
- ASK LARRY MAGUIRE MP for his knowledge of rail service regulation evolution.

---- It thus appears, there has been a lack of federal/provincial governments foresight to ensure, via legislation, that the long existing pump-jack oil industry would always have continued access to monopolistic limited pipeline capacity at fair terms. As a consequence, Alberta's traditional pump-jack oil economy now suffers.

2. Gov of Canada to require that only light oil (floats on water) may be transported in any public-owned pipeline

- Oilsands bitumen oil would thus be upgraded to lighter oil before being allowed to flow through Canada's new trans-mountain pipeline when built.
-- if an oil spill occurs, it is easier to clean-up if none of its components sink to the bottom of rivers or ocean
-- Andrew Weaver, Leader of BC Green party, enabling BC's minority government, has said they would accept the new pipeline if it did not carry heavy oil that would sink in water if there is a spill.

- Setting this rule will entice the Oilsands producers of heavy oil, to arrange for an upgrade to light oil processing activity in Alberta
-- some (eg Chinese investments) have access to adequate capital to build it, or build several small upgraders
-- economic activity will increase in Alberta during its construction and operation
- Stockwell Day, former Conservative leader/minister, has spoken in favour of value-added processing of bitumen to upgrade it all here in Canada.

3. Also, construct the new trans-mountain pipeline with a plan for alternative re-purposing:

(Because the internal combustion engine, as market for fossil fuels, is becoming obsolete.)

- For Water - such that a clean TransMountain pipeline shall later be reversed, to deliver desalinated ocean water to water-deficient Alberta cities, or

- For Hydrogen - such that it will store hydrogen fuel, produced via electrolysis, as energy storage from surplus solar, wind, hydro and nuclear electricity.

Grant Rigby
BSc Agric, MSc Food
homestead grain farmer, organic winery.
Upper Pembina, Earth (SWManitoba)

Top of Page

GreenHouseGas Levies & Rebates on Petroleum Products

Sent to all Canadian Premiers, Provincial and Territorial and Federal Environment and Natural Resources Ministers and Dep Prime Minister, copied to First Nations chiefs, December 30, 2019

Principle: Manufacturing of lower polluting petroleum products should be encouraged, and higher polluting petroleum products (eg burnables) discouraged.

Principle: Products incentives and disincentives should remain within the petroleum industry.

Principle: Entire life cycle pollution impacts of petroleum products should be comparatively weighted, including during manufacture, and from burning or ultimate disposal or recycling.

Principle: Greenhouse Gas is most urgent pollutant to curtail thus assess and reward on that basis in the first year, but all types of pollution should eventually be evaluated and weighted, and incentives/disincentives assessed proportionate to the total environmental impact of each.

Mechanism: Levies per kilogram would be added onto the wholesale transaction of higher polluting petroleum products (eg fossil fuels) produced in Canada (including for export), and then the fund from levies would be fully paid out as rebates at the wholesale transaction of lower polluting petroleum products (eg durable food-safe plastics) produced in Canada. The greater the product pollutes, the greater the levy. The lower the product pollutes, the greater the incentive up to 100 times the rate of levy per kilogram against the worst polluting product.

Evolution: At least annually seek advice and re-evaluate all petroleum products for relative GHG emission and other pollution.

Governance: Possibly via board appointed by Provinces with its salaries paid by Canada, to advise the responsible provincial and federal Ministers.

Consequence: Anticipate rapid reduction in greenhouse gas pollution from the petroleum products industries, as manufacturers compete to launch products that are the least GHG-releasing. Such products would typically be inventive value-added durable items, some likely of large scale, such as entire sidewalks, or insulated residential roofs or indeed entire dwellings built from pure petroleum or in composites with carbon sequestering plant fibers. Less of the resource will be wasted by burning for its mere energy content, as the more agile firms develop alternative creative products. Expect rapid creation of new petroleum manufacturing/marketing ownership and employment in Canada.

Grant Rigby Dec 2019

On my farm I shall sow camelina in companion with lentil in 2020, then separate the camelina (a brassica oilseed) to screw-press it for vegetable oil to fuel my tractor in 2021. Merely start the engine on diesel, and then when hot switch valves to run pure filtered camelina oil as the fuel. I also do not till the soil in fall, allowing mixed species to thrive and via roots exude sucrose, to feed soil fungi that can sequester that photosynthesized atmospheric carbon as new stable humus.

Top of Page


Principle: Purchasing of lower polluting automobiles should be encouraged, while purchasing of higher polluting automobiles should be discouraged.

Principle: Any incentives and disincentives should remain within the automobile industry, with neither outflow to nor inflow from government.

Principle: Entire life cycle pollution impacts of automobiles should be considered, including during manufacture, from fuel during usage, from maintenance and from disposal/recycling at life end.

Principle: Greenhouse Gas is most urgent pollutant to curtail, but all types of pollution should eventually be evaluated and weighted, and incentives/disincentives proportionate to the environmental impact of each.

Mechanism: Levies would be added onto the price of higher polluting automobiles and small trucks, and then the fund from levies would be fully paid out to the buyers of lower polluting automobiles and small trucks. The greater the polluting, the greater the levy. The lower the polluting, the greater the incentive.

Evolution: At least annually seek advice and re-evaluate all automobiles for relative polluting.

Governance: Possibly via board appointed by Provinces with salaries paid by Canada, to advise the Minister for regulations under the Transportation Act ?

Consequence: Expect rapid reduction in automobile greenhouse gas pollution, as manufacturers compete to design automobiles that are less polluting.

Extension: Apply the same principles to other GHG-generating motor industries:




Grant Rigby - June 2019

Top of Page


To: (first draft Nov 20, 2017) Hon. Rochelle Squires, Manitoba Minister of Sustainable Development
To: Hon, Cameron Friesen, Manitoba Minister of Finance
To: Hon. Ralph Eichler, Manitoba Minister of Agriculture
Keystone Agricultural Producers (in Nov 2017)


To slow climate change, via reducing atmospheric carbon dioxide, via photosynthetic sequestration of carbon into deep soil via plant roots; and

To create a fair "user-pay" taxation regime for water drainage infrastructure public works.

PRINCIPLE MECHANISMS - (reduced tax on living vegetation)

Separate the accounting for all public water drainage infrastructure costs, such as the costs for ditches, culverts, bridges, and major drainage works, away from the general government accounts, and instead separately fund such expenses entirely from property tax on those lands which are not functioning maximally to mitigate these costs.

Reduce general property taxes and other taxes by same amount - it is thus a revenue-neutral change.

Lands growing perennial vegetation or retaining water in living ponds would be zero-rated for this drainage-specific property tax, because those lands function to store and evapotranspire precipitation, and to retain and sequester atmospheric carbon dioxide, the same now as prior to industrialization.

Lands growing no living plants to capture solar radiation and remove carbon dioxide via photosynthesis, such as building roofs, bare saline soils and road surfaces, whether privately or publicly owned, would all be assessed for water drainage infrastructure costs at 100% rate.

Annual cropped lands would initially be assessed at a medium assessment between that of lands with perennial living plants and that of lands with none.

Measurement via satellite of relative duration and intensity of vegetation growth each year, eg measuring total absorption of photosynthesis wavelengths, could automatically calculate precise fair assessments for farmlands, residential, industrial, public lands, etc, relative to the zero-drainage-taxed lands having wild living perennial vegetation - (This correlates with retention of ancient soil humus and with photosynthesis-driven potential synthesis of new soil humus sequestering atmospheric carbon.)


Water retention, and carbon dioxide GHG sequestration in soil, are incentivized by reducing property tax on living vegetation.

Grant Rigby - July 1, 2019

Top of Page

Greenhouse Gas Import Tariffs, No GHG Zones, Perennial Roots

November 2015 - Sent to:
Government of Canada c/o Catherine McKenna, Chrystia Freeland, S. Dion, K. Lamoureux;
Parliament c/o Larry Maguire, Elizabeth May;
Government of Manitoba c/o Premier, Min Conservation, Min Industry C.Cullen.;
Government of Ontario c/o Min Environ Glen Murray.
Copy: info@climateforum; info@electricity; info@iisd; sdalby@wlu; editors@opencanada.

Proposed Resolutions for Adoption at Paris' Climate Change Meeting:

1. GreenHouse Gas Import Tariffs - to Fund UN Climate Disaster Assistance


Every country may use import tariffs, to entice its consumers to make GHG-responsible purchase decisions, via enacting selective import tariffs, to achieve greenhouse gas attribution equivalency with its own domestic industries' GHG:

- Tariffs based on UN data for GHG and Pollutants created during manufacturing/shipping;

- All funds raised via GHGP import tariffs are to be pledged to UN Climate Disaster Assistance Fund;

- GHGP import tariffs can be assessed per specific country, per specific industry in it, or per specific manufacturer providing that equivalent GHGP limitations are required of domestic manufacturers;

- GHGP import tariffs are to have precedence ranking above all other trade agreements."

For example: if 1.0 tonne of GHG is created in the domestic manufacture of a widget, yet 1.2 tonnes GHG is created in its manufacture in a specific foreign country, then an import tariff of up to 20% of its price could be lawfully assessed, even among signatories to "free-trade agreements".

This resolution would accelerate adoption of lower greenhouse gas production processes in the global economy, as manufacturers would seek to lower their own GHG and validate their low GHG, and encourage their home countries to lower national GHG, to avoid potential GHG tariffs into foreign markets.

For example, Canada might have unilaterally enacted fair GHG tariffs on imports from China's coal-fired economy several years ago, to have encouraged China's more rapid clean-up.

Principle of "Polluter Pays for Damages": greater tariffs against worst GHG emitters; the fund pays for GHG damages.

It should be relatively easy to achieve wide consensus for this resolution, because it empowers governments to act, voluntarily, and incentivizes industry without direct costs to governments.

If the world succeeds in averting climate disasters, governments retain the GHG tariffs collected.

2. Low-GHG-Intensity-Low-Pollution Certification

- Via the United Nations, establish voluntary certification programs to validate and rate the intensity of greenhouse gas and other pollutants emissions.

- A manufacturer, or an industry, or an industrial zone, might choose to participate as a challenge for itself, but also to differentiate itself to achieve higher products value via certification (similar to Certified Organic), and also to ensure low tariff access to foreign markets that may implement GHG import tariffs.

3. Negligible-GreenHouse-Gas Residential Zones

- Canadian Provinces to allow communities to democratically self-designate as No-GHG-Zones:

- A new residential development, for example, would prohibit all fossil fuel burning engines, and might first install solar panels and wind turbines to generate electricity for implements and tools for construction, and henceforth only geo-thermal and non-GHG energy for heat, power and transport.

- These would become the most desirable, clean air, quiet communities to live in, and that prestige would incentivize industries to serve them with new transportation and other products. Given that the automobile fleet is disposed within several years, it is conceivable that product innovation and competition could enable all residential communities to achieve NGHGZ for household power and personal transportation within 15 years.

4. Carbon Sequestering requires Perennial Living Roots

- Into farmlands currently used for annual cropping, adaptation of agronomy to reintroduce continuous perennial root life into the deep subsoil would be expected to sequester carbon, and thus valid for carbon capture incentives.

- Whereas merely reducing surface tillage while maintaining dead fallow processes in the subsoil ("zero-tillage farming") likely does not sequester carbon, and observation indicates it indeed leads to salinity occurring in formerly productive low areas and decline of plant growth and loss of food production.

- (explanation is within my soil salinity hypotheses essay at: www.rigbyorchards.com)

Grant Rigby, M.Sc.
Rigby Orchards estate winery and family homestead organic grain farm. Manitoba