Principle: Purchasing of lower polluting automobiles should be encouraged, while purchasing of higher polluting automobiles should be discouraged.

Principle: Any incentives and disincentives should remain within the automobile industry, with neither outflow to nor inflow from government.

Principle: Entire life cycle pollution impacts of automobiles should be considered, including during manufacture, from fuel during usage, from maintenance and from disposal/recycling at life end.

Principle: Greenhouse Gas is most urgent pollutant to curtail, but all types of pollution should eventually be evaluated and weighted, and incentives/disincentives proportionate to the environmental impact of each.

Mechanism: Levies would be added onto the price of higher polluting automobiles and small trucks, and then the fund from levies would be fully paid out to the buyers of lower polluting automobiles and small trucks. The greater the polluting, the greater the levy. The lower the polluting, the greater the incentive.

Evolution: At least annually seek advice and re-evaluate all automobiles for relative polluting.

Governance: Possibly via board appointed by Provinces with salaries paid by Canada, to advise the Minister for regulations under the Transportation Act ?

Consequence: Expect rapid reduction in automobile greenhouse gas pollution, as manufacturers compete to design automobiles that are less polluting.

Extension: Apply the same principles to other GHG-generating motor industries:




Grant Rigby - June 2019

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To: (first draft Nov 20, 2017) Hon. Rochelle Squires, Manitoba Minister of Sustainable Development
To: Hon, Cameron Friesen, Manitoba Minister of Finance
To: Hon. Ralph Eichler, Manitoba Minister of Agriculture
Keystone Agricultural Producers (in Nov 2017)


To slow climate change, via reducing atmospheric carbon dioxide, via photosynthetic sequestration of carbon into deep soil via plant roots; and

To create a fair "user-pay" taxation regime for water drainage infrastructure public works.

PRINCIPLE MECHANISMS - (reduced tax on living vegetation)

Separate the accounting for all public water drainage infrastructure costs, such as the costs for ditches, culverts, bridges, and major drainage works, away from the general government accounts, and instead separately fund such expenses entirely from property tax on those lands which are not functioning maximally to mitigate these costs.

Reduce general property taxes and other taxes by same amount - it is thus a revenue-neutral change.

Lands growing perennial vegetation or retaining water in living ponds would be zero-rated for this drainage-specific property tax, because those lands function to store and evapotranspire precipitation, and to retain and sequester atmospheric carbon dioxide, the same now as prior to industrialization.

Lands growing no living plants to capture solar radiation and remove carbon dioxide via photosynthesis, such as building roofs, bare saline soils and road surfaces, whether privately or publicly owned, would all be assessed for water drainage infrastructure costs at 100% rate.

Annual cropped lands would initially be assessed at a medium assessment between that of lands with perennial living plants and that of lands with none.

Measurement via satellite of relative duration and intensity of vegetation growth each year, eg measuring total absorption of photosynthesis wavelengths, could automatically calculate precise fair assessments for farmlands, residential, industrial, public lands, etc, relative to the zero-drainage-taxed lands having wild living perennial vegetation - (This correlates with retention of ancient soil humus and with photosynthesis-driven potential synthesis of new soil humus sequestering atmospheric carbon.)


Water retention, and carbon dioxide GHG sequestration in soil, are incentivized by reducing property tax on living vegetation.

Grant Rigby - July 1, 2019

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Greenhouse Gas Import Tariffs, No GHG Zones, Perennial Roots

November 2015 - Sent to:
Government of Canada c/o Catherine McKenna, Chrystia Freeland, S. Dion, K. Lamoureux;
Parliament c/o Larry Maguire, Elizabeth May;
Government of Manitoba c/o Premier, Min Conservation, Min Industry C.Cullen.;
Government of Ontario c/o Min Environ Glen Murray.
Copy: info@climateforum; info@electricity; info@iisd; sdalby@wlu; editors@opencanada.

Proposed Resolutions for Adoption at Paris' Climate Change Meeting:

1. GreenHouse Gas Import Tariffs - to Fund UN Climate Disaster Assistance


Every country may use import tariffs, to entice its consumers to make GHG-responsible purchase decisions, via enacting selective import tariffs, to achieve greenhouse gas attribution equivalency with its own domestic industries' GHG:

- Tariffs based on UN data for GHG and Pollutants created during manufacturing/shipping;

- All funds raised via GHGP import tariffs are to be pledged to UN Climate Disaster Assistance Fund;

- GHGP import tariffs can be assessed per specific country, per specific industry in it, or per specific manufacturer providing that equivalent GHGP limitations are required of domestic manufacturers;

- GHGP import tariffs are to have precedence ranking above all other trade agreements."

For example: if 1.0 tonne of GHG is created in the domestic manufacture of a widget, yet 1.2 tonnes GHG is created in its manufacture in a specific foreign country, then an import tariff of up to 20% of its price could be lawfully assessed, even among signatories to "free-trade agreements".

This resolution would accelerate adoption of lower greenhouse gas production processes in the global economy, as manufacturers would seek to lower their own GHG and validate their low GHG, and encourage their home countries to lower national GHG, to avoid potential GHG tariffs into foreign markets.

For example, Canada might have unilaterally enacted fair GHG tariffs on imports from China's coal-fired economy several years ago, to have encouraged China's more rapid clean-up.

Principle of "Polluter Pays for Damages": greater tariffs against worst GHG emitters; the fund pays for GHG damages.

It should be relatively easy to achieve wide consensus for this resolution, because it empowers governments to act, voluntarily, and incentivizes industry without direct costs to governments.

If the world succeeds in averting climate disasters, governments retain the GHG tariffs collected.

2. Low-GHG-Intensity-Low-Pollution Certification

- Via the United Nations, establish voluntary certification programs to validate and rate the intensity of greenhouse gas and other pollutants emissions.

- A manufacturer, or an industry, or an industrial zone, might choose to participate as a challenge for itself, but also to differentiate itself to achieve higher products value via certification (similar to Certified Organic), and also to ensure low tariff access to foreign markets that may implement GHG import tariffs.

3. Negligible-GreenHouse-Gas Residential Zones

- Canadian Provinces to allow communities to democratically self-designate as No-GHG-Zones:

- A new residential development, for example, would prohibit all fossil fuel burning engines, and might first install solar panels and wind turbines to generate electricity for implements and tools for construction, and henceforth only geo-thermal and non-GHG energy for heat, power and transport.

- These would become the most desirable, clean air, quiet communities to live in, and that prestige would incentivize industries to serve them with new transportation and other products. Given that the automobile fleet is disposed within several years, it is conceivable that product innovation and competition could enable all residential communities to achieve NGHGZ for household power and personal transportation within 15 years.

4. Carbon Sequestering requires Perennial Living Roots

- Into farmlands currently used for annual cropping, adaptation of agronomy to reintroduce continuous perennial root life into the deep subsoil would be expected to sequester carbon, and thus valid for carbon capture incentives.

- Whereas merely reducing surface tillage while maintaining dead fallow processes in the subsoil ("zero-tillage farming") likely does not sequester carbon, and observation indicates it indeed leads to salinity occurring in formerly productive low areas and decline of plant growth and loss of food production.

- (explanation is within my soil salinity hypotheses essay at:

Grant Rigby, M.Sc.
Rigby Orchards estate winery and family homestead organic grain farm. Manitoba